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I. INTRODUCTION
According to recent case law and commentary on labor and employ-
ment matters, the general concept recognized at common law that employees
can be "terminated-at-will" is still recognized today. Employees who are
not provided with written agreements setting forth a definite employment
term are characterized as employees "terminable-at-will," or "employees-at-
will."' Under the employment-at-will doctrine, an employer may terminate
the employee at any time for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.2
* Sole practitioner, Joseph Z. Fleming, P.A., Miami, Florida. B.A., 1962, University
of Florida; LL.B., 1965, University of Virginia School of Law; LL.M., 1966, New York
University Graduate School of Law; J.D., 1970, University of Virginia School of Law. Mr.
Fleming is a member of the Florida Bar, the American Bar Association, and the Dade County
Bar Association. He was listed in Martindale-Hubbell's Bar Register of Preeminent Lawyers
in 1993 as a specialist in labor and employment law and has lectured at numerous labor and
employment discrimination seminars.
1. See Dewachter v. Scott, 657 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
2. DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
aff'd, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980). The court held that "where the term of employment is
discretionary with either party or indefinite, then either party for any reason may terminate
1
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The employee also has the opportunity to terminate employment at any
time.'
The employment-at-will concept was developed under common law.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of terminating employees-at-will was
rejected in many jurisdictions which felt that the prevailing trend allowed
the judiciary to take a second look at common law theories involved in
employment law.4  Courts in such jurisdictions applied more liberal
assessment of employee rights.5 Jurisdictions such as California favored
public policy considerations forbidding employees from being terminated-at-
will and imposed "just cause" requirements in termination cases. However,
even liberal jurisdictions, such as California, restricted their initial inclina-
tion to totally abandon the employment-at-will concept. Instead, these
jurisdictions modified their public interest concerns and "just cause"
concepts.6
Florida courts, on the other hand, have been somewhat reluctant to
reverse the common law, concluding that it is a process for the legislative
and not the judicial branch.7 However, there have been indications over the
past fifteen years that Florida might be moving in a direction perceived by
some as a more liberal humanitarian approach!
The experiences of other jurisdictions, the increasing statutory rights
afforded to employees in the work place, and reevaluation of public policy
considerations all suggest that the employment-at-will doctrine is advanta-
geous-not only for the jurisdiction but the employees in it. Recently, the
doctrine has been accepted further through the courts' recognition that the
it at any time and no action may be maintained for breach of the employment contract." Id.
at 136.
3. See Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1994); Dewachter, 657 So.
2d at 962; Catania v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 381 So. 2d 265, 266 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(noting that, in Florida, "if the period of employment is indefinite either party may terminate
it at any time"); DeMarco, 360 So. 2d at 136; Hope v. National Airlines, Inc., 99 So. 2d 244
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1957), cert. denied, 102 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1958).
4. For an interesting overview of the evolution from common law to the more recent
decisions which have challenged the utilization of the employment-at-will concept, see
WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES 342 (1985) [hereinafter HOLLOWAY & LEECH].
5. See source cited supra note 4.
6. Cf. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (Ct. App. 1980)
(discussing the implied covenant to use a duty of just cause in termination cases).
7. See Arrow Air, 645 So. 2d at 424.
8. See id.; see also Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182,
185 (Fla. 1983) (Overton, J., concurring) (stating that he would "proceed a step further [than
the majority] and establish a common law tort for retaliatory discharge").
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employment-at-will doctrine is not only an appropriate continuation of the
common law, that should not be abandoned, but also benefits all of the
parties concerned.
This article presents an overview of the current status of the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine in Florida. Part II provides an analysis of the recent
case law interpreting the doctrine. Part III presents commentary on the
employment-at-will concept and the discrepancies between the legislative
and judicial interpretations of the doctrine.
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
DOCTRINE
A. Definition of Employment-At-Will
In a recent Florida case, Dewachter v. Scott,9 the court identified basic
concepts found in employment-at-will contracts. 10 In Dewachter, the
plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract alleging that her employer induced
her to leave full-time employment by orally promising her employment for
life or at least until she reached the age of sixty-five. The court held that
oral contracts for lifetime employment are terminable-at-will." The court
reasoned that absent an employment contract expressly providing for a
definite term of employment, the employment is indefinite and, therefore,
terminable-at-will by either party) 2
Under the common law employment-at-will doctrine, which has been
supplemented by the Florida Statutes, certain statutory rights enable the
employee to recover unpaid wages for work performed. Additionally, there
are statutory rights which permit employers to place restrictions on subse-
quent competition in consideration for an employment-at-will contract.1
3
9. 657 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
10. Md at 962-63.
11. I (citing Smith, 427 So. 2d at 182).
12. Id The court also held that even though the plaintiff:
couched her complaint as fraud in the inducement rather than breach of contract,
... her claim is still barred as it attempts to circumvent the bar to a breach of
contract action based on an oral contract terminable at will. Since the parties
clearly cannot be restored to the status quo that existed before the alleged
contract, as might be sought in an action based on fraud in the inducement, the
measure of damages Dewachter sought here would be the same as breach of
contract damages.
13. FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1993).
1995]
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These statutes, which also apply to written contracts of employment, 4
clearly expand the benefits and the obligations that relate to employment-at-
will situations. For example, under the employment-at-will doctrine, the
employee is entitled to receive the appropriate pay for the work that has
been performed. The legislature has supplemented common law rights by
allowing employees to sue not only for wages, but for unpaid commissions
which have been earned and not yet paid. Should the employees prevail,
they can also seek statutory attorneys' fees.15
In 1994 and 1995, the state courts in Florida reconfirmed the validity
of the employment-at-will doctrine as the appropriate rule for judicial
interpretation of employee rights. Courts have held that where there are no
definite terms of employment, that employment is and should be regarded
as "at-will." For example, in Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 6 the Supreme
Court of Florida confirmed that employees are terminable "at-will" unless
there is a specific statutory provision to the contrary. 7 The court noted
that the legislature has the authority to change the employment-at-will
concept and can limit the ability of an employer to terminate its employ-
ees. 8 Arrow Air is significant because the supreme court rejected the
lower court's ruling which had enabled a terminated employee to retroac-
tively assert a Whistle-blowing claim19 before the statute had been
enacted.20
The Third District Court of Appeal noted that the termination-at-will
rule was harsh.21 In fashioning a judicial interpretation of whether a
statutory provision such as the Whistle-blower's Act should be interpreted
retroactively, the court found that public policy pervaded the situation.22
The court found that statutory provisions, whether they were enacted before
or after the events in question, suggest a more liberal attitude towards
employees.23 As a result, employees are able to overcome defenses raised
14. See generally Sanz v. R.T. Aerospace Corp., 650 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1995).
15. FLA. STAT. § 448.104 (1993). The statute states that "[a] court may award
reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and expenses to the prevailing party." Id.
16. 645 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1994).
17. Id. at 424.
18. Id.
19. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187 (1993).
20. Arrow Air, 645 So. 2d at 425.
21. Walsh v. Arrow Air, Inc., 629 So. 2d 144, 148 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd,
645 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1994).
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by employers that a statute is inapplicable because the event occurred before
the law was enacted.
The Supreme Court of Florida, however, rejected this reasoning, finding
the statutes to be prospective only. 4 Arrow Air is consistent with other
recent Florida cases which found that although the legislature has the ability
to change the law so as to preclude employment terminations without
meeting or satisfying statutory prerequisites, employees can be terminated
for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all, unless there is a statutory
provision to the contrary. As the Third District Court of Appeal noted in
Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc.,25 "[t]he established rule in Florida is that
when the term of employment is discretionary or indefinite, either party may
terminate the employment at any time for any reason or no reason without
assuming any liability."26
B. Statutory Restrictions on Noncompete Agreements
Courts have refused to uphold claims by employees seeking a
continuation of an employment relationship which is terminable-at-will. In
addition, courts have refused to enforce oral employment agreements not to
be performed within the space of one year. However, an employer does
have the ability to enforce an agreement not to compete even in a termina-
ble-at-will situation as long as the restriction on such competition is
consistent with the statute of frauds. In other words, the enforcement does
not occur for a period of more than one year.
In Sanz v. R.T. Aerospace Corp.,7 the Third District Court of Appeal
held that an agreement not to compete entered into by an employee who
continued working under an oral agreement was not enforceable because of
the statute of frauds.28 The court refused to extend a written agreement
which barred the employee from competing for two years following
termination of employment to a subsequent oral agreement.2 9 The court
noted that:
Under the statute of frauds, any agreement that is not to be performed
within the space of one year from its making must be reduced to
24. Arrow Air, 645 So. 2d at 424-25 (citing Landgraf v. USI Films Prods., 114 S. Ct.
1483 (1994) (applying Title VII prospectively only)).
25. 476 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
26. Id. at 1328.
27. 650 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
28. Id. at 1060.
29. Il at 1059.
1995]
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writing in order to be enforceable. Further, Sanz's continued perfor-
mance after the expiration of the written agreement pursuant to any oral
agreement with R.T.A. cannot serve to remove the agreement from the
confines of the statute of frauds. The law is clear that the doctrine of
partial performance of an oral agreement has no applicability to
personal service contracts.30
In addition, the legislature has placed other restrictions on noncompete
agreements such as restraining employees from competing when their
employer sells the goodwill of the business.3' However, it is inconsistent
to maintain that an employer can terminate an employee in a wrongful
manner while, simultaneously, being allowed to enforce a noncompete
agreement. Thus, the courts have generally recognized that where there is
a noncompete clause preventing the employee from taking advantage of
confidential business information, the employer will be prohibited from
enforcing that otherwise enforceable covenant after wrongfully discharging
the employee.32
As William Holloway and Michael Leech note in Employment
Termination Rights and Remedies:33
The governing principle of contract law is that any material failure
of performance by one party that is not justified by the conduct of the
other discharges the latter's duty to perform under the contract.
Accordingly, if an employer wrongfully discharges the employee prior
to expiration of the contract, the employee is relieved from honoring a
covenant not to compete. Any other outcome would strip the employee
of his ability to earn a livelihood.34
30. Id. at 1060 (citations omitted).
31. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1993); Lovell Farms, Inc. v. Levy, 641 So. 2d
103, 105 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that even if a noncompete agreement were
enforceable, a court, before determining that it would grant an injunction to enforce such an
agreement, must engage in a balancing test). The court also noted that it must "weigh the
public interest, the potential effects on the employee, and the legitimate interests of the
employer, to determine the enforceability of the non-compete contract." Lovell Farms, 641
So. 2d at 105.









Federal courts that have interpreted Florida law in the past few years
have also recognized that employees cannot maintain that they have a public
policy right to challenge employment decisions terminating their employ-
ment at-will in the absence of a contract or specific statutory right.
Moreover, employees cannot raise oral contractual claims that they could
only be terminated for cause, or assert that they can contest their termination
based on contract claims, when they were employed at-will. For example,
the court in Golden v. Complete Holdings, Inc.,35 stated that "the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine is the law in Florida.' 36  The court stated that:
"'[W]here the term of employment is discretionary with either party or
indefinite, then either party for any reason may terminate it at any time and
no action may be maintained for breach of employment contract."'37
Federal courts have also rejected the theory that an employee's
retaliatory termination could constitute a tort of retaliatory termination. In
Zombori v. Digital Equipment Corp.,38 the court noted:
Florida's at-will employment doctrine may be "cold-hearted,
draconian and out-dated," but it is the law of Florida. Notably,
Florida's legislature and courts have created exceptions to the at-will
doctrine allowing employees to assert wrongful discharge claims in
defined circumstances. By doing so, Florida's legislators and judges
have attempted to conform the doctrine to current public policy. Given
these officials are elected and appointed by the people of Florida, it is
their duty to define Florida law on this and other subjects.
While the Court regularly interprets Florida law to resolve claims
in diversity cases, it is not the Court's place to expand Florida's
common law by creating new causes of action. Federal courts are
entrusted to apply state law, not make it. As of today, Florida does not
35. 818 F. Supp. 1495 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (confirming that an employee can be terminated
as an employee-at-will for good reason, bad reason or no reason at all).
36. Id. at 1497.
37. Id. (quoting DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 360 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980)) (alteration in original). The court in
Golden also noted Florida cases such as Hartley, which confirmed that a plaintiff cannot sue
based on a type of contract theory. However, the court also noted allegations involving
attempts to humiliate the plaintiff into resigning and other misconduct which did not relate
to contractual allegations, but rather, to possible tort claims. Id. at 1496-99.
38. 878 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Fla. 1995).
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permit employees to sue employers for retaliatory discharge based on
a common law prima facie tort theory. 9
III. A REVIEW OF THE LITERARY COMMENTARY
An increase in conservative philosophy caused a rise in recent analysis
of the benefits of the employment-at-will doctrine by commentators. This
is due in part because conservative commentators seek to prevent judicially
made law from eroding the termination-at-will doctrine. Another reason for
the increased analysis may be the numerous legislative humanitarian rights
provisions allowing employees to sue their employers. As a result, the
factors that caused concern over the employers exploitation of employees
and the excessive control employers possessed over the employees have
changed. Undoubtedly, the enactment of statutes relating to labor and
employment law which give employees more rights to challenge their
employers' decisions (especially in the more progressive jurisdictions) has
also contributed to the rise in recent commentary. Thus, a review of the
basic texts on labor and employment law will illustrate the increase in such
laws as well as the decrease in the need to question the employment-at-will
doctrine.40
Peter Panken, a management labor lawyer, provided an illustration of
the availability of employee rights in a fairly liberal jurisdiction, such as
New York or California.4 ' Panken concluded that "[o]ne act by an
employee can give rise to 36 or more causes of action. 42 Panken also
noted that if an employer were to "[flire a 42-year-old minority woman shop
steward with a bad back and 4 years 11 months seniority, [the employer]
may face at least 36 different litigations .... ,,43 Some examples of these
include unemployment insurance claims, grievances, and arbitration of
grievances under the collective bargaining agreement. 44  Examples of
39. Id. at 209-10.
40. See generally SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (Patrick Hardin, et al., eds., 3d ed. 1992 & Raymond L.
Wheeler, et al., eds., Supp. 1994); BARBARA LINDEMAN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2d ed. 1982 & David A. Cathcart & R. Lawrence
Ashe, Jr., eds., Supp. 1989).
41. Peter M. Panken et al., Avoiding Employment Litigation: Alternative Dispute
Resolution of Employment Disputes in the 90s, in 2 AIRLINE AND RAILROAD LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 553, 553-54 (ALI-ABA 1994).
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discrimination charges under the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion ("EEOC") include charges complaining of failure to hire, failure to
promote, or discharge due to age, sex, race, national origin, and religion.45
Despite the expanding statutory remedies, employees still raise alternate
theories for recovery when challenging an employer's decision to terminate.
This occurs where employees fail to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for
jurisdiction over a particular claim, where jurisdiction was satisfied pursuant
to pendant jurisdiction, or where various counts where filed to supplement
the statutory claims. Often, there are allegations that the employee was
improperly terminated because the employer did not have "just cause."
Thus, employees argue that the courts should ignore, modify or establish
exceptions to the common law rule that employees can be terminated at-will.
However, because of the numerous remedies available to employees,
it may be more difficult for courts to reach the conclusion that continuation
of the termination-at-will doctrine will result in management abuse. Even
in those jurisdictions recognizing the employment-at-will doctrine, there are
numerous vehicles which provide protection for employees, and enable
employees to challenge employment decisions that are inconsistent with laws
45. Id. The remaining causes of action include:
State (or city) administrative charges of discrimination on the basis of:
(9) Disability; (10) Gender; (11) National origin; (12) Race; and (13)
Age;
NLRB charges of:
(14) Discrimination for union activities (exercising § 7 rights to
form, join and assist labor organizations) even as the union is
charged with (15) Breach of its Duty of Fair Representation;
Federal lawsuits for discrimination on the basis of:
(16) Age (over 40); (17) Race; (18) Sex; (19) National origin; and
(20) Disability;
Federal lawsuits on the basis of:
(21) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (22) Complicity with union in
its violation of its Duty of Fair Representation; and (23) ERISA §
510 lawsuits (termination to avoid obtaining or payment of benefits);
State lawsuits for discrimination on the basis of:
(24) Race; (25) Gender; (26) National Origin; (27) Disability; and
(28) Age;
State lawsuits on the basis of:
(29) Wrongful termination for whistleblowing; (30) Discharge for a
reasons "against public policy"; (31) Libel; (32) Slander; and when
all else fails (33) Intentional; and (34) Negligent infliction of
emotional distress as well as (35) Prima Facie tort; and finally (36)
Retaliation for filing any of the above charges.
Panken, supra note 41, at 553.
1995]
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protecting employees. For example, these laws include causes of action for
discharge due to ethnicity, sex, age, disability, family status, Whistle-
blowing activities, and statutes which preclude retaliation because the
employee chooses to file suit.
46
However, these statutory provisions are so extensive that they counter-
balance the equities previously used by the courts to evaluate whether the
employment-at-will doctrine should be rejected due to the doctrine's
unfairness to employees. Courts also have to consider the viability of the
historical argument that management has all of the power and control in the
work place. Thus, numerous commentators recognize that by undermining
the management rights and prerogatives through statutory provisions, the
balance has shifted.47
In many instances, however, commentators are industry-oriented. As
a result, many have relocated to states with a favorable labor climate, such
as Florida. These right-to-work jurisdictions are less restrictive and tend to
influence commentators' evaluation of the employment-at-will doctrine.48
In addition, the increase in articulate spokespersons from the conservative
"Chicago School" of thought has resulted in a number of publications and
texts which document the advantages of the doctrine. One leading
proponent for this type of analysis is Richard Epstein, author of Simple
Rules for a Complex World,49 who comments extensively on the validity
46. Examples of statutes providing protection for employees who elect to file a cause
of action against their employer for statutory violations include: civil, workers' compensa-
tion, and Whistle-blowing statutes.
47. See PHILIP K. HOwARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE 46, 133-44 (1994).
48. See, e.g., David Tuller, Moviemakers Come to Mainstreet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
1986, at 4. The article notes that California had $4 billion in estimated revenues from
motion pictures and featured television production, New York had $1.7 billion, and Florida
had $114 million in revenues and was third in national ranking. Id. The article further notes
that the "action" is not just in California and New York because the other 48 states are
wooing and winning film producers as well. In addition to state underwriting of expenses,
the article concludes that another advantage to operating in states other than New York and
California relates to lower labor costs because "[labor costs in right-to-work states like
Florida, North Carolina, and Texas can be as much as 25 percent lower than those in New
York." Id. Since employers in most cases are the ones that determine whether they are
going to operate in a state, this right-to-work provision creates an initial attraction. This
ultimately increases motion picture productions in these right-to-work states by assisting
employers. Even employees and unions may benefit by virtue of increased work, although
unions constantly press to eliminate the right to work provisions and do not agree with the
management approach that there are advantages for a state to exercise its right to work
option. Id.
49. RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).
Vol. 20
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of the "contract at will."5 Epstein notes that there are advantages for a
"contract at will." Such a contract is basically terminable-at-will, and as
such:
provides both sides with a secured obligation. The point sounds strange
given that one side can quit and the other side can fire, without any
explanation. For most people, the idea of security connotes a mortgage
or a lien on some form of property - the home mortgage is perhaps the
most familiar example. But it is appropriate to expand our horizons on
this point. The employer who decides to fire a worker has to pay a
price, that is, he will no longer be able to reap the benefits of the
worker's labor. Conversely, the worker who decides to quit will no
longer be able to command the wage. Each obligation is held hostage
to the other. Before quitting or firing, one has to make a hard decision
about whether the benefit forgone is worth the labor or the wages that
can now be retained. But once a decision to sever the arrangement is
made, the security on the other side is instantly realized, without the
formalities and delay of foreclosure proceedings. The worker instantly
recovers her labor, and the employer his cash. Knowing the efficiency
of the security arrangement, people will move with caution, given that
it is always costly to exercise the right to quit or to fire.5'
In addition, Epstein notes that the right to quit, or to fire, created by the
termination-at-will doctrine has "powerful and desirable incentive effects.
In particular, it serves as an effective check against the advantage-taking
open to either side in a continuous relationship."52 Epstein notes additional
advantages to the doctrine such as "moderating" influences which tend to
prevent either party from obtaining an advantage over the other, and the
"durability" of the doctrine due to its "fragile" legal nature.53  Because
either party can terminate the employment at any time, a fragile employment
relationship results. This relationship is thus strengthened, and hence
durable, because the parties are not required to enter into long-term
agreements which often cause additional demands and disputes over the
employment terms. Epstein argues further that "[t]he utility of the contract
at will is also strengthened by reputational forces. The employer with a
large work force is constrained in dealing with any particular employee.
Firing the first worker for reasons that other workers perceive as unfair will
50. Ud at 156-59.
51. d at 157-58.
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have powerful ripple effects throughout the firm. 54 In concluding, Epstein
suggests that the "ease of its enforcement" is a final major advantage of the
termination-at-will doctrine." The author states that:
The legal position is this: I quit, or you fire me; judgment for the
defendant. The entire system takes about two words to explicate in the
standard case. "Anything goes" within the legal system precisely
because anything will not go in the business setting. Simplicity has its
dividends, for both sides can share in the administrative savings in the
form of higher profits and higher wages. Only the lawyers lose when
the contract at will is fully respected.56
IV. INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION
It has been suggested that the statutory provisions are inconsistent
because they allow an employee who was terminated for exercising a
workers' compensation claim to be able to obtain reinstatement of that
employment, while not extending similar protection to all employees in
Florida.57 This statutory right permitting an employee to return to work
effectively eliminates the termination-at-will concept. However, statutory
provisions reflect important for public policy reasons. As a result, they do
not permit the same right to be asserted in other situations such as to
prevent a retaliatory firing of a employee at-will. The difference is due to
the legislative intent of a particular provision of the statute. Such legislative
intent has been articulated in the workers' compensation and Whistle-
blowing statutory provisions.
In these situations, the legislature reached conclusions resulting in
legislative provisions which changed the relationship between the parties in
the employment field by designating certain conduct as protected, and thus,
precluding termination because of it. The distinction between the statutory
provisions and the ability of courts to legislate policies through judicial
54. EPSTEIN, supra note 49, at 158.
55. Id. at 159.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Stephen G. DeNigris, The Public Policy Exception: The Need to Reform
Florida's At-Will Employment Doctrine After Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Laboratories
and Bellamy v. Holcomb, 16 NOVA L. REV. 1079 (1992) (arguing that conservative
jurisprudence notwithstanding, the termination-at-will doctrine should be abandoned or
reformed); Mark E. Walker, Comment, Workers' Compensation: Florida's Resistance to
Nonstatutory Limits to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 43 FLA. L. REV. 583 (1991).
Vol. 20
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decisions is the difference which the courts have recognized, and utilized,
in their decisions not to strike down the termination-at-will concept.
As recent decisions have indicated, the increase in statutory provisions
also makes it very difficult for the judiciary to formulate public policy
arguments to undermine or eliminate the employment-at-will doctrine.
Difficulties exist not only because of the complexity of laws but because of
the inconsistencies in the statutory provisions. Additional inconsistencies
result where judges attempt to fashion a common law remedy which is
precluded under the statutory provisions. One example of this problem is
found where the inconsistencies in federal statutory provisions have caused
litigants to seek judicial resolution of the inconsistencies. For example, in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Attorney General of the United States,5" the
employer sought declaratory and injunctive relief to eliminate conflicting
legislative mandates and to "coordinate its equal opportunity laws., 59 The
opinion provided the employer's arguments:
[S]ocial attitudes, economic realities and earlier government policies -
specifically veterans preference schemes - combined to produce a
business environment in which most of the responsible and remunerative
posts were occupied by white males. Sears complains that these
previously established priorities in employment conflict with subse-
quently established priorities in employment.
In the second part of the complaint, Sears attempts to attribute the
alleged shortage of well-qualified female and minority applicants to the
government's failure to enforce equal opportunity laws in housing,
education and employment.60
Despite such allegations, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled that the judiciary could not resolve inconsisten-
cies in federal legislation because of Article Im of the Constitution which
prohibits the resolution of matters that do not involve an actual case or
controversy. 61 The court ruled that 'a controversy in [the Article III]
sense involves considerably more than mere abstract philosophical disagree-
58. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 916 (D.D.C. 1979).
59. Id. at 916.
60. Id at 917.
61. Id (discussing U.S. CONsT. art. III).
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ment with the wisdom, propriety, or desirability of specific governmental
activities .... 62
In addition to the statutory inconsistency problem, there are also
problems with statutory provisions that preclude a judicially mandated "just
cause" standard. For example, in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co.,63 an employee was discharged due to age in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). The employer subsequently
discovered that the employee was guilty of misconduct that would have
supported the termination had the employer been aware of the conduct at the
time. The court held that although an employer may possess after acquired
evidence that would give him just cause to discharge the employee, the
employer is precluded from doing so because of an express statutory
provision to the contrary. 64 In other words, although courts might conclude
that the employee could have been terminated because of the employee's
improper conduct, the statutory policy, which favors relief for the employee,
may override and excuse the misconduct.65 As a result, just cause to
terminate an employee cannot be the sole standard applied in evaluating
whether the employment decision complained of by the employee was
proper.
A judicial body of law, which undermines the employment-at-will
doctrine and requires the establishment of the "just cause" standard for
termination, may not answer the question of whether the statutory prerequi-
sites have been complied with for the purpose of protecting statutory rights.
Federal statutory rights may preclude the need to evaluate a state common
law system which uses "just cause" because even establishing such a
standard would not resolve the question of whether a federal statute had
been violated.
In the same sense, Florida courts interpreting Florida statutes will also
have to evaluate the prerequisites for statutory protection. For example, an
employee who satisfied the requisites for suing under the Whistle-blowing
provisions" of the Florida Statutes might have acted in a manner that
would justify the employee's termination under a judicially created "just
cause" standard. However, if the employee establishes that the employee
was also terminated because of retaliation for Whistle-blowing activity,
62. Id. (quoting Gaillot v. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 464 F.2d 598 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972)) (alteration in original).
63. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1993).
64. Id. at 883-84.
65. Id.
66. FLA. STAT. §§ 448.101(5), .102 (Supp. 1994).
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which is protected under the statute, further judicial proceedings would be
required.
Thus, balancing the inconsistencies in the federal and state statutory
provisions and adding the fact that statutory provisions take precedence over
the common law issues may further reduce the reasons for the courts to
undermine the termination-at-will doctrine. On the other hand, it is equally
argued that courts can create a common law doctrine and should not be
dissuaded from doing so merely because, in certain cases, that doctrine may
be eliminated by statutory provisions. However, the courts would then be
faced with the proposition that the legislature has not yet eliminated the
termination-at-will doctrine in enacting various additional employment
rights. Thus, adding judicial modifications to the common law that conflict
with existing and expanding statutory provisions might be counterproductive.
V. CONCLUSION
It appears that conservative commentators now suggest additional
policy reasons for the continuation of the employment-at-will doctrine.
Moreover, the liberal commentaries, which are now decreasing, have also
conceded that more judges are now deferring to the legislature. Thus, the
question to be resolved in future years is whether a retreat from complex
employment rights created by statutory laws would cause a resurgence of
judicial opinions evaluating the employment-at-will doctrine. At this point,
however, the legislature has not decreased the rights and protections afforded
employees. Notwithstanding the conservative commentary and plentiful
rhetoric in both federal and state legislative bodies, there does not appear to
be a retreat from employment regulation in the work place by virtue of state
and federal laws. For this reason, the recent decisions which have sustained
the doctrine of employment-at-will in view of increasing statutory labor and
civil rights laws, appear to demonstrate a trend which will continue. Based
upon recent judicial rulings and trends, it appears that the employment-at-
will doctrine will be with us for some time to come.
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